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Hybrid logics internalize their own semantics. Members of the newer family of justiﬁcation
logics internalize their own proof methodology. It is an appealing goal to combine these
two ideas into a single system, and in this paper we make a start. We present a
hybrid/justiﬁcation version of the modal logic T. We give a semantics, a proof theory, and
prove a completeness theorem. In addition, we prove a Realization Theorem, something that
plays a central role for justiﬁcation logics generally. Since justiﬁcation logics are newer and
less well known than hybrid logics, we sketch their background, and give pointers to their
range of applicability. We conclude with suggestions for future research. Indeed, the main
goal of this paper is to encourage others to continue the investigation begun here.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Hybrid logics are modal logics that internalize aspects of possible world semantics. They contain in their language spe-
cial propositional letters, nominals, that designate possible worlds, rather like the designation of instants of time in some
kinds of temporal logics. The presence of nominals can be exploited to give smooth, uniform treatments of completeness,
interpolation, and other results. They are covered quite thoroughly in [1], and also in [5,6].
More recently a quite different family of logics, justiﬁcation logics, has been developed. Rather than semantics, these in-
ternalize aspects of proofs. Justiﬁcation logics began with a logic called LP, in [2]. The name stood for “logic of proofs.” LP
formed part of a program to provide an arithmetic semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic. As is well known, intu-
itionistic logic embeds in S4, a result due to Gödel [8]. The diﬃculty is, the necessity operator of S4 cannot be thought of as
formal provability in arithmetic, because of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. But S4 necessity can be thought of as
an abstraction of explicit provability, an idea due to Gödel [9] but left unpublished, and independently discovered by Arte-
mov. This was the motivation for the creation of LP, in which the modal operator has been replaced with a family of explicit
proof terms. Artemov showed that S4 embeds in LP, that is, for each theorem of S4, there is a way of replacing necessity op-
erators with explicit proof terms to produce a theorem of LP. This is called a Realization Theorem. Indeed, these proof terms
internalize actual LP proofs, in a sense that will be discussed further below. In turn, LP itself embeds in formal arithmetic,
Artemov’s Arithmetic Completeness Theorem. All this together provides an arithmetic semantics for intuitionistic logic.
Since then it has been understood that proofs are one kind of justiﬁcation, and there can be others. Further, S4 is not
the only modal logic to which these techniques can be applied. By now there is a rich and growing family of justiﬁcation
logics, corresponding to K, T, S4, S5, and so on, multimodal/multiagent versions of these, versions with quantiﬁers over
justiﬁcations, with quantiﬁers over objects, and so on. Work continues, with the present paper being part of it. The ideas
have been particularly fruitful when applied to epistemic logics, since they allow for the manipulation of explicit reasons for
knowledge or belief. Justiﬁcation logics even provide appropriate machinery for the formal treatment of various well-known
philosophical problems. Artemov’s recent paper, [4], provides a broad summary of justiﬁcation logics and their applications,
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logics is maintained by Roman Kuznets, and can be accessed at http://kuznets.googlepages.com/justiﬁcationlogicbibliography.
Given all this, it is a natural question whether there might be justiﬁcation logic versions of hybrid logics. Such things
would be of interest because they would, in a sense, internalize both semantics and proofs. In this paper a beginning is
made on the investigation of these questions. Not everything I would like to do has been done. There is enough success to
be encouraging, and enough left open to provide work for those interested. I have not provided a hybrid/justiﬁcation version
of the simplest normal modal logic K; the reasons for this are rather technical and will be pointed out at appropriate places.
Instead I provide a justiﬁcation logic version of hybrid T, with nominals and the @ operator, but without the common named
world assumption, that is, it is not assumed that in the semantics every possible world is named by a nominal. For this logic,
I formulate a semantics, an axiom system, and provide proofs of completeness and a Realization Theorem. How to handle
named worlds is an open question. In fact, several open questions are discussed at the end of the paper. What I hope to do
here is stimulate others to work on these problems.
2. Justiﬁcation logics
We begin with a quick overview of the basics of justiﬁcation logics, since these are generally less familiar than hybrid
logics. In the next section I give my version of basic hybrid logic, justiﬁcation style.
2.1. The language
The simplest justiﬁcation logic is known as J; it corresponds to the simplest normal modal logic, K. We begin with
the family of justiﬁcation terms for J. These are built up from justiﬁcation variables: x1, x2, . . . ; and justiﬁcation constants:
c1, c2, . . . . They are built up using the operation symbols: + and ·, both binary. The operation · is an application operation.
The intention is, if t is a justiﬁcation of X ⊃ Y and u is a justiﬁcation of X then t · u is a justiﬁcation of Y . The operation +
combines justiﬁcations, t + u justiﬁes whatever t justiﬁes and also whatever u justiﬁes. A justiﬁcation term is called closed
if it contains no justiﬁcation variables.
Formulas are built up from propositional letters: P1, P2, . . . , and a falsehood constant, ⊥, using ⊃ in the usual way, together
with an additional rule of formation, t : X is a formula provided t is a justiﬁcation term and X is a formula. The intuition
is, t : X asserts that X is the case and t serves as a justiﬁcation for it. Other connectives are deﬁned as usual. We assume a
tight binding for the colon operator, and omit parentheses when possible. Thus, for example, t : X ⊃ X should be understood
as (t : X) ⊃ X .
2.2. An axiom system for J
Here is a list of axiom schemes (though we use the term ‘axiom’ for short).
Classical Axioms all tautologies
+ Axioms t : X ⊃ (t + u) : X
u : X ⊃ (t + u) : X
· Axiom t : (X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (u : X ⊃ (t · u) : Y )
For rules, of course we have the standard one.
Modus Ponens
X X ⊃ Y
Y
Finally there is a version of the modal necessitation rule, but only at the atomic level. The idea is that constant symbols
serve as justiﬁcations for truths that we do not further analyze. Essentially, unanalyzed are our axioms, and our usage
of constant symbols themselves. The rule is formulated to allow arbitrary constants to be used, but if desired, constant
speciﬁcations can be brought in to exert some control. This will be discussed shortly.
Iterated Axiom Necessitation If X is an axiom and c1, c2, . . . , cn are constants, then c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : X .
Suppose X is an axiom and, say, c : d : X has been introduced into a proof using the rule above. We think of d as a
justiﬁcation of X , and c as a justiﬁcation of the fact that d justiﬁes X , and do not examine these claims more deeply.
A constant speciﬁcation C is a speciﬁcation of which constants are to be used with which axioms. More precisely, it is
a set of formulas of the form c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : X , where each ci is a constant and X is an axiom. A constant speciﬁcation
is required to be closed under the condition: if c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : X ∈ C then c2 : . . . : cn : X ∈ C . A proof meets constant
speciﬁcation C provided that whenever c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : X is introduced using the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule, then this
formula is a member of C . A constant speciﬁcation can be given ahead of time, or can be created during the course of a
proof. Various conditions can be imposed on constant speciﬁcations. A constant speciﬁcation is axiomatically appropriate if it
supplies constants for all instances of axiom schemes. That is, if X is an instance of an axiom scheme, then for any n there
are constants, c1, c2, . . . , cn such that c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : X is in the constant speciﬁcation. Axiomatic appropriateness plays an
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proofs. Here axiomatic appropriateness will always be assumed. Other conditions play a role for various purposes, but we will
not consider them here.
If X is a theorem of a normal modal logic, so is X , and this is usually taken as a basic rule. For J there is a provable
analog due to Artemov, [3]—indeed the proof amounts to internalizing the structure of J proofs. We state the result here,
and give a hybrid version and its proof in Section 4.2.
Theorem 2.1 (Internalization). If X is a theorem of J, then there is a closed justiﬁcation term t such that t : X is also a theorem. (In
fact, t can be produced constructively from any axiomatic proof of X .)
The justiﬁcation logic J was formulated axiomatically above. Sequent calculus formulations also exist—one is given in [3]
for instance—and hence also tableau formulations. Unfortunately, all current versions include a rule that does not obey the
subformula principle, and this somewhat limits their uses.
Combinators, in the usual sense, can be introduced as constants. For instance, the K combinator can be represented by
a constant symbol k, where k : (A ⊃ (B ⊃ A)) is taken to be a theorem introduced via an Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule.
Then the · operation corresponds to application of combinators, and thus combinatory logic embeds into a fragment of
justiﬁcation logic. This was pointed out by Artemov, in [3].
Finally, if we think of J as a logic of belief, justiﬁcation terms can be used to limit the problem of logical omniscience.
We could restrict things to formulas that do not involve justiﬁcation terms that are ‘too complex,’ measured in terms of
number of symbols, or nesting depth of terms, or some other way. Justiﬁcation terms provide us with natural machinery for
the measurement of complexity.
2.3. Semantics for J
The earliest semantics for justiﬁcation logics is in [10]. In [7] a possible world semantics was formulated, with the
semantics of [10] as a single-world version of it. It is this possible world semantics that we present here.
A model is M = 〈G,R,E,V〉, where G and R are a state set and an accessibility relation, as usual. V is a valuation and
maps each propositional letter to a set of states. The new item is E , which is an admissible justiﬁcation function, or evidence
function. The idea is, E assigns to each justiﬁcation term t and each formula X a set of states—those states in which t is
considered to be relevant evidence for X . Relevant evidence is not meant to be conclusive evidence. The date of publication
listed on the title page of a book is relevent evidence for the date on which the book was published, though it could be in
error. The color of the binding of a book would not be relevant evidence for date of publication. Here are the conditions on
evidence functions.
Weakening E(s, X) ∪ E(t, X) ⊆ E(s + t, X).
Application E(t, X ⊃ Y ) ∩ E(u, X) ⊆ E(t · u, Y ).
Constant speciﬁcation We say E meets constant speciﬁcation C provided, if c : X ∈ C then E(c, X) = G .
A forcing relation, , between states and formulas is deﬁned, with much of the deﬁnition standard—the usual modal
condition is replaced by something more complex.
M,Γ  P ⇐⇒ Γ ∈ V(P ), for P a propositional letter
M,Γ ⊥
M,Γ  X ⊃ Y ⇐⇒ M,Γ  X or M,Γ  Y
M,Γ  t : X ⇐⇒ M, X for all  ∈ G with Γ R and Γ ∈ E(t, X)
The ﬁnal condition says that we have t : X at Γ if X is necessary at Γ in the sense of being true at all accessible worlds,
and t is admissible evidence for X at Γ .
There is also a stronger version of the semantics. A model M is said to be fully explanatory provided, if M,  X for
all  ∈ G with Γ R then there is some justiﬁcation t such that M,Γ  t : X . Loosely, things that are necessary have their
reasons.
The following was proved in [7]. Fix a constant speciﬁcation C (axiomatically appropriate). A formula X has a proof in J
meeting speciﬁcation C if and only if X is true at all states of all J models meeting speciﬁcation C if and only if X is true
at all states of all J models that are fully explanatory and meet speciﬁcation C .
2.4. The Realization Theorem
If one takes an axiom of J and replaces every justiﬁcation term occurrence by  one gets an axiom of the normal
modal logic K. Likewise the same replacement turns instances of modus ponens in J into instances of modus ponens in K, and
instances of Iterated Axiom Necessitation into iterated instances of the usual necessitation rule. This replacement is called
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Consequently, the forgetful functor maps theorems of J into theorems of K.
In fact, the forgetful functor is a surjective mapping—a result of fundamental importance. Every theorem of K is the
image of a theorem of J under the forgetful functor. Indeed, one can be more precise.
Theorem 2.2 (Realization). If X is a theorem of K, there is some replacement of all  occurrences so that negative occurrences are
replaced by distinct justiﬁcation variables, with the result being a theorem of J, using some axiomatically appropriate constant speciﬁ-
cation.
The Realization Theorem says that every theorem of K expands into a theorem of J in which reasons for occurrences
of modal operators are provided. Negative occurrences of , becoming variables, act like inputs while positive occurrences,
becoming terms that may involve those variables, act like outputs. Modal theorems have an implicit input/output structure
that justiﬁcation terms make explicit.
The Realization Theorem is due to Artemov. By now there are several proofs. Most are constructive, as was Arte-
mov’s original one, in [2]. These proofs extract justiﬁcation terms from sequent calculus proofs in K. There is also a
non-constructive proof that uses the semantics of Section 2.3, and comes from [7]. We will make use of this semantic
approach when we come to a hybrid version of J below.
2.5. A few other justiﬁcation logics
The justiﬁcation logic discussed above was J, corresponding to the modal logic K. In fact all of the normal modal logics
T, K4, S4, S5, and others as well, have justiﬁcation versions. The one corresponding to S4 was the ﬁrst to be developed, as
part of the project we discussed earlier to provide an arithmetic semantics for intuitionistic logic. It was, and still is, known
as LP. The other justiﬁcation logics are known as JT, JK4, and JS5. Here is a brief sketch of them.
For JT, LP, and JS5, one adds an axiom scheme t : X ⊃ X , sometimes called factivity because it asserts that justiﬁcations
only serve to justify facts. Semantically, one requires that accessibility be reﬂexive, as usual.
For JK4, LP, and JS5, an additional operation is needed. It is written !, and is called proof checker or positive justiﬁcation
checker. The idea is that !t serves to verify that t is a justiﬁcation of !X , if in fact it is. Axiomatically one adds the scheme t :
X ⊃!t : t : X . Semantically some special requirements are needed. The evidence function must satisfy the condition E(t, X) ⊆
E(!t, t : X). Also, evidence functions are required to be monotonic: if Γ ∈ E(t, X) and Γ R, then  ∈ E(t, X). And ﬁnally,
accessibility is required to be transitive, as might be expected. If ! is present, the Iterated Axiom Necessitation Rule can be
replaced by a simpler version, but we do not go into details here.
Finally, for JS5 still one more operation is needed, ?, a negative justiﬁcation checker. Axiomatically one adds ¬t : X ⊃?t :
¬t : X . We omit the semantic conditions.
For all these logics, soundness and completeness theorems are provable, as are Internalization Theorems and, most
importantly, Realization Theorems connecting them with their modal counterparts. Thus for each of the most common
modal logics there exists a justiﬁcation version that, in a straightforward sense, internalizes its proof structure.
The modal logics just mentioned are not all that have been considered. There are multi-modal versions, thought of as
logics of explicit knowledge. There are versions with both explicit justiﬁcations and implicit ones, that is, conventional modal
operators. There are versions in which one quantiﬁes over justiﬁcations. And there is current work on a ﬁrst-order version
of justiﬁcation logics with quantiﬁers over a domain in the usual way. All this is very much in progress.
3. Basic hybrid logic
Hybrid logics internalize aspects of their semantics. Possible worlds are represented directly, while accessibility only a
little less directly. Probably the best references are [1,5,6]. The presentation here is rather minimal, since hybrid logics are
generally more familiar than justiﬁcation logics.
Hybrid languages come with various items of machinery, in order to formulate logics of varying strengths. For now we
are primarily concerned with the language known as H(@). The language is an extension of that of conventional modal
logic. One adds a new family of propositional letters, called nominals—we use i, j,k, . . . for this purpose. In addition there is
a preﬁx operator, @i , for each nominal i, so that @iϕ is a formula if ϕ is.
Semantically, nominals are interpreted as being true at exactly one world, and so a nominal can be thought of as a name
for a possible world. Then @iϕ is taken to be true at an arbitrary possible world if ϕ is true at the world named by i. The
semantics then divides in two, depending on whether all possible worlds have nominal names, or not. If one requires every
world to have a name, we have named models—not all models are named models. Hybrid logics are usually axiomatized
so that every satisﬁable formula is actually satisﬁable in a named model. From this condition a number of important and
elegant consequences follow. Without this condition we have basic hybrid logic, still of interest but less so. In this paper we
add justiﬁcation terms to basic hybrid logic only. Going beyond this poses diﬃculties that, hopefully temporarily, we do not
know how to overcome.
Besides propositional letters, nominals, and @ operators, the language has the usual connectives, we will take ⊃ and
⊥ as basic with others deﬁned, and it has modal operators. The possibility operator ♦ is often taken as basic, with 
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usual with propositional modal logic, with the additional constructor: if X is a formula, so is @i X for each nominal i.
For an axiomatization of basic hybrid logic, we have the usual classical and modal axiom schemes and rules for K, and
some conditions speciﬁc to hybrid logic. In the following, i, j, . . . are any nominals and X, Y , . . . are any formulas. This is
taken from [5]. We begin with axioms.
classical all tautologies
K (X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (X ⊃Y )
K@ @i(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (@i X ⊃ @i Y )
dual ♦X ≡ ¬¬X
self-dual @i X ≡ ¬@i¬X
introduction (i ∧ X) ⊃ @i X
ref @i i
sym @i j ≡@ j i
nom (@i j ∧@ j X) ⊃ @i X
agree @ j@i X ≡ @i X
back ♦@i X ⊃ @i X
For rules we have the usual, plus a version of necessitation for @i .
modus ponens
X X ⊃ Y
Y
-Necessitation XX
@-Necessitation
X
@i X
Easily provable are the following.
elimination (i ∧@i X) ⊃ X
bridge (♦i ∧@i X) ⊃ ♦X
dual-back @i X ⊃@i X
We note that the dual-back scheme can be used in place of back.
Soundness and completeness arguments can be found in [1,5], with respect to models not required to meet a named
worlds condition.
4. Basic hybrid justiﬁcation logic
We now present a logic combining aspects of basic hybrid logic and justiﬁcation logic. Rather than give a hybrid version
of the simplest justiﬁcation logic, J, we give one for JT. This is because of technical reasons, though the assumption can
be weakened—see the comments following the axiom below. At the end of the paper we list some open problems, and
extending the present work to J is one of them. We call the logic basic hybrid-JT. A named worlds assumption is not made,
for this logic.
4.1. Language and axioms
We use a combination of the language machinery from Sections 2.1 and 3, together with some additional items. We
refer to the language as J H(@)—it serves as a minimal hybrid/justiﬁcation language. Coming from the hybrid side we have
nominals and @ operators, as in Section 3. For building justiﬁcation terms we have justiﬁcation constants and variables,
and operations + and ·, as in Section 2.1. In addition we have the following. For each nominal i we have a justiﬁcation
constant f i , which we call a remote fact checker. And for each nominal i we have preﬁx operators !i , remote positive justiﬁcation
checker and ?i , remote negative justiﬁcation checker. If t is a justiﬁcation term, so are !it and !?t . These are related to, but
should not be confused with, the preﬁx operators ! and ? that were mentioned in Section 2.5. Reasons for the names will
discussed below.
For axioms, we combine those of justiﬁcation logic with those of hybrid logic, and add a few more. For starters we have
the following, which concern the hybrid and the justiﬁcation machinery separately.
Hybrid axioms and rules The axioms and rules of Section 3, except those having to do with . That is, we omit K , dual,
back, and -Necessitation.
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Factivity axioms t : X ⊃ X . (Recall, we are creating a hybrid version of JT, not of J.)
The Factivity Axioms play an important role in the proof of Proposition 4.2. As it happens, factivity is not needed in full
generality. We only need the two schemas: u : @i X ⊃ @i X and u : ¬@i X ⊃ ¬@i X . It would be interesting to consider a logic
in which only these are added, but we do not do so here.
Now we come to items that involve both hybrid and justiﬁcation machinery simultaneously. Informally, a state is a
collection of ‘facts.’ As Wittgenstein has it, “The facts in logical space are the world” [11]. Facts that make up a state should
be veriﬁable as doing so. A little more precisely, if i is a possible world that we can ‘use’, we must be able to certify what
the facts of i are. Formally we have the following proper axioms, not schemes. It is here that the indexed family f i of
constant symbols is used.
Remote fact checker For each nominal i and propositional letter P , @i P ⊃ f i : @i P and @i¬P ⊃ f i : @i¬P .
Next, if it is claimed that t serves to justify some formula X at a given state i, it is required that it be checkable anywhere
whether the claim is correct or not. It is here that the !i and ?i operators are used. For any formula X , any justiﬁcation
term t , and any nominal i, the following are axioms (that is, we are dealing with axiom schemes once again).
Remote positive justiﬁcation checker @it : X ⊃ (!it) :@it : X .
Remote negative justiﬁcation checker @i¬t : X ⊃ (?it) : @i¬t : X .
Finally we adopt one more rule, in which the role of justiﬁcation constants is expanded somewhat. As things were in
Section 2.1, constants served as justiﬁcations for axioms, which were not further analyzed. But axioms are axioms no matter
where we ﬁnd them, and should be veriﬁable at each particular world.
Iterated remote axiom necessitation Let i be any nominal. If X is an axiom and c1, c2, . . . , cn are constants, then c1 : c2 :
. . . : cn :@i X .
Proposition 4.2 is of fundamental importance in our development. As mentioned above, the Factivity Axioms are used in
its proof. It is also where Iterated Remote Axiom Necessitation has its fundamental application. This completes the axiom
system for basic hybrid-JT. Constant speciﬁcations are as they were in Section 2.2, except that now in addition to containing
formulas of the form c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : X , they also may contain formulas of the form c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : @i X , where i is a
nominal. Now we say a proof meets constant speciﬁcation C provided that whenever c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : X is introduced using
the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule, then this formula is a member of C , and whenever c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : @i X is introduced
using the Remote Axiom Necessitation rule, this formula is in C . We still use the terminology axiomatically appropriate for
certain constant speciﬁcations—those in which each axiom has speciﬁed constants to justify it, both directly and remotely.
4.2. Internalization
We stated, but did not prove, an Internalization Theorem for the justiﬁcation logic J, Theorem 2.1. In this section we
do provide a proof for an Internalization Theorem for basic hybrid-JT. There are a few preliminary items to take care of
ﬁrst, however. Throughout we assume we are using an axiomatically appropriate constant speciﬁcation. Recall that ¬X
abbreviates X ⊃ ⊥. The following lemma is almost immediate. Note that the Factivity Axioms are not needed for this.
Lemma 4.1. For every atomic formula X, and for every nominal i, there are closed justiﬁcation terms t and u such that both @i X ⊃ t :
@i X and @i¬X ⊃ u : @i¬X are provable in basic hybrid-JT.
Proof. An atomic formula is either a propositional letter or ⊥, so the proof divides into two easy cases.
If X is a propositional letter P , the remote fact checker axioms take care of things.
Now suppose X is ⊥. It is easy to show that @i⊥ ⊃ ⊥ is a theorem of hybrid logics generally, and so also of basic
hybrid-JT. It follows that @i⊥ ⊃ t : @i⊥ is a theorem for every justiﬁcation term t . Finally, since ¬⊥ is ⊥ ⊃ ⊥, which is a
tautology, the Remote Axiom Necessitation rule gives us c : @i¬⊥, and hence @i¬⊥ ⊃ c :@i¬⊥ is trivially provable. 
The next item plays an important role in the proof of Internalization. It really amounts to a realization of (an equivalent
formulation of) the back schema of standard hybrid logics. Here the Factivity Axioms play an important role.
Proposition 4.2. For every formula X, not necessarily atomic, and for every nominal i, there are closed justiﬁcation terms t and u such
that both @i X ⊃ t :@i X and @i¬X ⊃ u :@i¬X are provable in basic hybrid-JT.
Proof. By induction on the degree of X , deﬁned as the number of connectives, @ symbols, and t: occurrences in X . The
atomic case is covered by Lemma 4.1. Beyond the atomic level we have several cases, and subcases. In some of these we
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K@ axiom and the @i rule of necessitation. Consequently @i(Y ∧ Z) ≡ (@i Y ∧@i Z) is provable in the usual way. Then, using
the self-dual scheme it follows that @i(Y ∨ Z) ≡ (@i Y ∨@i Z) is also provable.
Now suppose X is not atomic, and the result is known for formulas of lower degree.
Case: X is Y ⊃ Z , positive subcase. We have:
@i(Y ⊃ Z) ⊃ @i(¬Y ∨ Z)
⊃ (@i¬Y ∨@i Z)
By the induction hypothesis there are closed justiﬁcation terms u and v such that both @i¬Y ⊃ u : @i¬Y and @i Z ⊃ v :
@i Z are provable, and hence so is the following.
@i(Y ⊃ Z) ⊃ (u :@i¬Y ∨ v : @i Z)
The formula ¬Y ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z) is a tautology, so by iterated remote axiom necessitation we have c : @(¬Y ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)), for some
constant c. Also @i(¬Y ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)) ⊃ (@i¬Y ⊃ @i(Y ⊃ Z)) is a K@ axiom and hence by iterated axiom necessitation so is
d : [@i(¬Y ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)) ⊃ (@i¬Y ⊃ @i(Y ⊃ Z))] for some constant d. Then using the · axiom, we derive (d · c) : (@i¬Y ⊃
@i(Y ⊃ Z)). Then by the · axiom again, we have u :@i¬Y ⊃ ((d · c) · u) : @i(Y ⊃ Z).
By an argument similar to the one given in the previous paragraph we can prove the formula v : @i Z ⊃ (( f · e) · v) :
@i(Y ⊃ Z), where e is a constant remotely justifying the axiom @i(Z ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)) and f is a constant justifying the K@
axiom @i(Z ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)) ⊃ (@i Z ⊃@i(Y ⊃ Z)). Then, using the + axioms, we have the following.
@i(Y ⊃ Z) ⊃ (u :@i¬Y ∨ v : @i Z)
⊃ [((d · c) · u) : @i(Y ⊃ Z) ∨
(
( f · e) · v) : @i(Y ⊃ Z)
]
⊃ [((d · c) · u + ( f · e) · v) : @i(Y ⊃ Z) ∨
(
(d · c) · u + ( f · e) · v) : @i(Y ⊃ Z)
]
⊃ ((d · c) · u + ( f · e) · v) : @i(Y ⊃ Z)
Case: X is Y ⊃ Z , negative subcase. This time, using the induction hypothesis, there are closed justiﬁcation terms u and v
so that the following is provable.
@i¬(Y ⊃ Z) ⊃ @i(Y ∧ ¬Z)
⊃ (@i Y ∧@i¬Z)
⊃ (u :@i Y ∧ v : @i¬Z)
Using iterated remote axiom necessitation we have c : @i[Y ⊃ (¬Z ⊃ ¬(Y ⊃ Z))] for some constant c. And since instances
of axiom K@ are involved, there are justiﬁcation constants d and e such that d : {@i[Y ⊃ (¬Z ⊃ ¬(Y ⊃ Z))] ⊃ [@i Y ⊃
@i(¬Z ⊃ ¬(Y ⊃ Z))]} and e : [@i(¬Z ⊃ ¬(Y ⊃ Z)) ⊃ (@i¬Z ⊃ @i¬(Y ⊃ Z))] are provable. Then making use of the ·
axiom, we have (d · c) : [@i Y ⊃ @i(¬Z ⊃ ¬(Y ⊃ Z))], and hence again u : @i Y ⊃ ((d · c) · u) : @i(¬Z ⊃ ¬(Y ⊃ Z)). At this
point we have
@i¬(Y ⊃ Z) ⊃
[(
(d · c) · u) : @i
(¬Z ⊃ ¬(Y ⊃ Z)) ∧ v : @i¬Z
]
Next, in a similar way, we get
@i¬(Y ⊃ Z) ⊃
[(
e · ((d · c) · u)) : (@i¬Z ⊃ @i¬(Y ⊃ Z)
) ∧ v :@i¬Z
]
and ﬁnally we have the following.
@i¬(Y ⊃ Z) ⊃
((
e · ((d · c) · u)) · v) :@i¬(Y ⊃ Z)
Case: X is @ j Y , positive subcase. Using the induction hypothesis we have the provability of @ j Y ⊃ u : @ j Y for some u.
Then using @-necessitation and the K@ axiom, we also have @i@ j Y ⊃ @iu : @ j Y . Applying the remote positive justiﬁcation
checker axiom we get @i@ j Y ⊃ (!iu) :@iu : @ j Y .
The factivity axiom gives us u : @ j Y ⊃ @ j Y . Then iterated remote axiom necessitation gives c : @i(u : @ j Y ⊃ @ j Y ) for
some constant c. Since @i(u : @ j Y ⊃ @ j Y ) ⊃ (@iu : @ j Y ⊃ @i@ j Y ) is a K@ axiom, there is a constant d that justiﬁes
it. Then, using the · axiom, we have provability of (d · c) : (@iu : @ j Y ⊃ @i@ j Y ), and hence also of (!iu) : @iu : @ j Y ⊃
((d · c)·!iu) : @i@ j Y . Combining things, we have shown provability of @i@ j Y ⊃ ((d · c)·!iu) : @i@ j Y .
Case: X is @ j Y , negative subcase. This is similar to the preceding case, but makes use of the self-duality of @ j We omit
details.
Case: X is w : Y , positive subcase. Covered by the remote positive justiﬁcation checker axiom.
Case: X is w : Y , negative subcase. Covered by the remote negative justiﬁcation checker axiom. 
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Justiﬁcation Logics are capable of representing their own axiomatic proof structures. Here is a version for hybrid-JT. The
proof of it is as signiﬁcant as the result itself—it amounts to showing that axiomatic proofs internalize as justiﬁcation terms.
What follows is an extension of the original Artemov argument.
Theorem 4.3 (Internalization). If X is a theorem of basic hybrid-JT, then there is a closed justiﬁcation term t such that t : X is also a
theorem.
Proof. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn = X be a proof of X in the basic hybrid-JT axiom system of Section 4.1. We show that for each
k  n there is some closed justiﬁcation term tk such that tk : Xk is provable. The case k = n establishes the theorem. The
proof is by induction on k (although the induction hypothesis is actually needed for only one case).
Assume the result is known for all m < k; we show it holds for k as well. There are several cases to consider.
Case: Axiom Suppose Xk is an axiom. Then c : Xk is provable for some justiﬁcation constant c, by Iterated Axiom Necessitation.
Case: Modus Ponens Suppose Xa and Xb = (Xa ⊃ Xk) are formulas with a,b < k. By the induction hypothesis there are
closed terms ta and tb so that ta : Xa and tb : (Xa ⊃ Xk) are both provable. Then, using the · axiom, and modus ponens,
(tb · ta) : Xk is also be provable.
Case:@-Necessitation Suppose Xk = @i Xm for some m < k. Since @i Xm is provable, using Proposition 4.2 (and modus ponens)
there is some closed term t such that t : @i Xm is provable.
Case: Iterated Axiom Necessitation Suppose Xk = c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : Z where Z is an axiom. Then we also have c0 : c1 : c2 : . . . :
cn : Z by iterated axiom necessitation, for some c0, and this is c0 : Xk .
Case: Iterated Remote Axiom Necessitation Similar to the previous case. 
4.3. Semantics
The semantics given in Section 2.3 can be easily modiﬁed to one appropriate for the mixed system we have been
considering. A basic hybrid-JT model is a structure M = 〈G,R,E,V〉 that meets the conditions for being a J model, as in
Section 2.3, with certain additional conditions imposed to cover the justiﬁcation machinery added for the hybrid version.
First, since we are considering a hybrid version of JT, and not of J, the accessibility relation R must be reﬂexive.
Next, the valuation V is modiﬁed in the usual hybrid way so that for each nominal i, the set V(i) is a singleton. If
V(i) = {Γ }, in an abuse of notation we will generally write V(i) = Γ . It is not required that V map the set of nominals onto
the set of worlds—we do not have a named worlds assumption.
Since we have three additional operators on justiﬁcation terms, the deﬁnition of E , the admissible evidence function,
must be extended.
f i , remote fact checker For a propositional letter P and a nominal i, if V(i) ∈ V(P ) then E( f i,@i P ) = G , and if V(i) /∈ V(P )
then E( f i,@i P ) = ∅.
!i , remote positive justiﬁcation checker If V(i) ∈ E(t, X) then E(!it,@it : X) = G .
?i remote negative justiﬁcation checker If V(i) /∈ E(t, X) then E(?it,@i¬t : X) = G .
Finally since we have @ in the language, the deﬁnition of  must be extended.
M,Γ @i X ⇐⇒ M,V(i) X
This completes the speciﬁcation of models for basic hybrid-JT.
4.4. Completeness
Let C be an axiomatically appropriate constant speciﬁcation, ﬁxed for this section. We will show that a formula X is
provable in the basic hybrid-JT axiom system of Section 4.1, using C , if and only if X is true at all states of all basic hybrid-JT
models of Section 4.3 that meet C if and only if X is true at all states of all models that meet C and are fully explanatory.
Actually, the soundness direction of the result just stated is straightforward, and is left to the reader. For the complete-
ness direction we use a direct combination of the justiﬁcation logic argument from [7] and the hybrid argument from [5].
We sketch the ideas, and refer to these sources for more details.
First we take from [5] the following result (reproduced with original theorem numbering from that reference). Note that
Kh-MCS means a maximally consistent set in a particular hybrid logic that corresponds to the one we are using. Also a
nominal i is said to be a name for a Kh-MCS set Γ if i is in Γ , and Γ is named if there is a name for it.
Lemma 7.24. Let Γ be a Kh-MCS. For every nominal i, let i be {φ | @iφ ∈ Γ }. Then:
i For every nominal i, i is a Kh-MCS that contains i.
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iii For all nominals i and j, @iφ ∈  j iff @iφ ∈ Γ .
iv If k is a name for Γ , then Γ = k.
The proof of this lemma, given in [5], only uses machinery that is also available in our basic hybrid-JT, and so the results
may be applied here as well. Now here is a sketch of our completeness argument.
Call a set S of formulas in the language J H(@) inconsistent if there is some ﬁnite subset {s1, . . . , sn} ⊆ S such that
(s1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn) ⊃ ⊥ is provable in basic hybrid-JT. Call S consistent if S is not inconsistent. Recall we are assuming a ﬁxed
axiomatically appropriate constant speciﬁcation C is used.
Let S be a consistent set of formulas. Following [5] we construct a model in which S is satisﬁed. The construction is in
two stages.
Stage 1. Let G1 be the collection of all maximally consistent sets of formulas. For each Γ ∈ G1, set Γ  to be {X | t : X ∈ Γ }
for some justiﬁcation term t . Let Γ R1 if Γ  ⊆ . For each propositional letter P (including nominals), set V1(P ) = {Γ ∈
G1 | P ∈ Γ }. And ﬁnally, set E1(t, X) = {Γ ∈ G1 | t : X ∈ Γ }. We now have a structure M1 = 〈G1,R1,E1,V1〉.
The structure M1 meets some, but not all, of the conditions for being a hybrid-JT model. Because of the factivity axiom,
R1 is reﬂexive. The admissible evidence function meets the conditions given in Section 2.3. But for a nominal i, V1(i) might
not be a singleton.
Stage 2. We have the consistent set S , extend it to a maximally consistent set Σ . Of course Σ ∈ G1. For a nominal i, let
i = {Z | @i Z ∈ Σ}. By Lemma 7.24 part i, every i is maximally consistent, and is named by i, and so i ∈ G1. Now let G2
be the subset of G1 that is generated by Σ together with the various i . That is, each member of G2 is the last term of a
sequence in which every term (except the last) is in the relation R1 to the next, and in which the ﬁrst term is either Σ
or some i . Let R2, E2, and V2 be the restrictions of R1, E1, and V1 to G2. We have the structure M2 = 〈G2,R2,E2,V2〉,
and this is actually the model we want, though proving it takes a certain amount of work. Note, incidentally, that if Γ ∈ G2,
 ∈ G1, and Γ R1 then  ∈ G2. This plays a role below.
We show that if any member of G2 contains @i X , they all do, for any formula X . The property in question holds for
the subset of G2 consisting of Σ and the various  j , by Lemma 7.24, part iii. Since G2 is the subset of G1 generated
by these members, it is enough to show that, for any Γ, ∈ G2, if Γ R2 then @i X ∈ Γ if and only if @i X ∈ . The
argument has two parts. Suppose ﬁrst that @i X ∈ Γ . By Proposition 4.2, and the maximal consistency of Γ , t : @i X ∈ Γ
for some justiﬁcation term t , so @i X ∈ , by deﬁnition of R2 (actually, of R1). Next, suppose that @i X /∈ Γ . By maximal
consistency, ¬@i X ∈ Γ , and by self-dual, @i¬X ∈ Γ . Then by an argument similar to the previous one, @i¬X ∈  and then
again, @i X /∈ .
Next we show that for any nominal i and any Ω ∈ G2, if i ∈ Ω then Ω = i . Well, suppose i ∈ Ω . We show i ⊆ Ω . Let
X ∈ i . Then @i X ∈ Σ , so @i X ∈ Ω , by the previous paragraph. Since i ∈ Ω , X ∈ Ω , by elimination. The reverse inclusion is
similar, making use of maximal consistency and negation.
It follows from what was just shown that, for each nominal i, V2(i) is a singleton, in fact, V2(i) = i . We also easily get:
for any Γ ∈ G2, @i X ∈ Γ if and only if X ∈ i .
Now it is easy to verify that M2 = 〈G2,R2,E2,V2〉 has all the appropriate properties. We verify one item and leave the
rest to the reader.
Suppose V2(i) /∈ E2(t, X). We show E2(?it,@i¬t : X) = G2, the remote negative justiﬁcation checker condition for E2.
Well, V2(i) = i , so by deﬁnition of E2 (and E1), t : X /∈ i , and by maximal consistency, ¬t : X ∈ i . Then @i¬t : X ∈ Σ , and
hence @i¬t : X is in every member of G2. It follows, using the remote negative justiﬁcation checker axiom, that (?it) : @i¬t : X
is in every member of G2, and so E2(?it,@it : ¬X) = G2.
Next we establish the familiar
Truth Lemma. For any Γ ∈ G2 and any formula X,
M2,Γ  X ⇐⇒ X ∈ Γ
The proof is by induction, as usual. Propositional cases are standard, and are omitted. For the @ case, we proceed as
follows. M2,Γ  @i X is equivalent to M2,i  X , using the fact that V2(i) = i . By the induction hypothesis, this is
equivalent to X ∈ i . We showed above that this is equivalent to @i X ∈ Γ for every Γ .
Finally we check the justiﬁcation term case. The two directions require different arguments.
Suppose ﬁrst that t : X ∈ Γ . Then Γ ∈ E2(t, X), by deﬁnition. Also, for every  ∈ G2 with Γ R2, we have X ∈  by
deﬁnition of accessibility. By the induction hypothesis, M2, X for all accessible . It follows that M2,Γ  t : X . In the
other direction, if t : X /∈ Γ , then Γ /∈ E2(t, X), hence M2,Γ  t : X .
We have established that M2 is a model, and of course the consistent set S is satisﬁed in it, at Σ . It remains to show
that M2 = 〈G2,R2,V2,E2〉 satisﬁes the fully explanatory condition, from Section 2.3. Suppose M2, X for every  ∈ G2
such that Γ R2. We will show that M2,Γ  t : X for some justiﬁcation term t . Stating this in contrapositive form, and
making use of the Truth Lemma, we show that if t : X /∈ Γ for every justiﬁcation term t , then X /∈  for some  such that
Γ R2. So, suppose that for every justiﬁcation term t , t : X /∈ Γ .
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G2 ∧ · · · ∧ Gn ∧ ¬X) ⊃ ⊥ would be provable, and hence so would (G1 ⊃ (G2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ (Gn ⊃ X) · · ·)). Using Internalization,
Proposition 4.2, there is a justiﬁcation term u such that u : (G1 ⊃ (G2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ (Gn ⊃ X) · · ·)) is provable. For each i = 1, . . . ,n,
since Gi ∈ Γ  , there is some justiﬁcation term si such that si : Yi ∈ Γ . Now by repeated use of the · axiom, we conclude
(· · · ((u · s1) · s2) · . . . · sn) : X ∈ Γ , contradicting the assumption that t : X /∈ Γ for every t .
Now that we know Γ  ∪ {¬X} is consistent, we can extend it to a maximal consistent set . By deﬁnition,  ∈ G1 and
Γ R1. Since Γ ∈ G2, then also  ∈ G2 and Γ R2. And of course X /∈ .
Deﬁnition 4.4. For a consistent set S , we call the model M2 constructed above the S-canonical model.
Completeness now follows in the standard way. If X is not a theorem of hybrid-JT, then {¬X} is consistent, hence
satisﬁed in the {¬X} canonical model, and so X is falsiﬁed at a possible world of a basic hybrid-JT model meeting the fully
explanatory condition.
5. The Realization Theorem for basic hybrid JT
If we think of the  of a modal logic as an implicit knowledge operator, X asserts that we know X . But in a justiﬁcation
logic, t : X asserts we know X for an explicit reason, t . In this sense justiﬁcation logics provide an explicit analysis of the
usual implicit formalization of knowledge. A precise statement of this is embodied in the Realization Theorem, which was
ﬁrst proved by Artemov in [3], in a version that connected the justiﬁcation logic LP with the modal logic S4. Since then
Realization Theorems have been provided for other logics, and additional ways of proving them have been developed. In
this section we state and prove a Realization Theorem connecting basic hybrid-T with its justiﬁcation version basic hybrid-JT.
To be precise, what we mean by basic hybrid-T is the logic axiomatized in Section 3, together with the schema X ⊃ X , and
whose semantics is that of reﬂexive Kripke models with nominals, but without a named world assumption.
First we consider the easy direction. Suppose, in any formula of basic hybrid-JT, we replace every justiﬁcation term with
an occurrence of . So, for instance, t : (u : X ⊃ X) becomes (X ⊃ X). Call this the forgetful functor. It is easy to check
that if we apply the forgetful functor to any axiom of basic hybrid-JT, the result is an axiom of basic hybrid-T. Likewise the
forgetful functor turns rules of derivation for basic hybrid-JT into rules of basic hybrid-T. It follows that the forgetful functor
converts entire proofs using justiﬁcations into their counterpart modal proofs. Thus we have the following.
Proposition 5.1. If X j is a theorem of basic hybrid-JT, with respect to any constant speciﬁcation, and X is the result of applying the
forgetful functor to X j , then X is a theorem of basic hybrid-T.
As we said, this is the easy direction. In fact the forgetful functor not only maps basic hybrid-JT to basic hybrid-T, but the
mapping is onto. This is the hard part, and is an immediate consequence of the following.
Theorem 5.2 (Realization). Let X be a theorem of basic hybrid-T. There is some formula X j of J H(@) such that:
(i) in X j negative occurrences of  in X have been replaced with distinct justiﬁcation variables;
(ii) in X j positive occurrences of  in X have been replaced with justiﬁcation terms, not necessarily variables;
(iii) X j is provable in basic hybrid-JT using some axiomatically appropriate constant speciﬁcation.
In the theorem above, X j is called a realization of X . Applying the forgetful functor to X j yields X and so we have the
onto result mentioned earlier, but there is more to say. Notice that negative  occurrences in X become justiﬁcation vari-
ables. This says that theorems of basic hybrid-T have a hidden input/output structure—positive occurrences of  implicitly
represent reasons that can be computed from the reasons implicitly represented by negative occurrences of .
In the remainder of this section we will prove the Realization Theorem. Artemov’s original proof was constructive, making
use of modal sequent calculus proofs. Since then other constructive proofs have been developed, and there is a semantic,
non-constructive one in [7]. It is this non-constructive argument on which we base the present proof.
5.1. Realization, weakly
What is established in this section is not the ‘real’ Realization Theorem. We formulate an embedding result, but it does
not have the simple form we want. That will come in the next section, making use of the version shown here. In [7] the
weaker version was considered more carefully and became a partial analysis of the role of + in justiﬁcation logics. We do
not take this care now, and the work of this section should be thought of as simply a preliminary to the main event.
Let ϕ be a formula in the language of H(@), containing modal operators but not justiﬁcation terms. We want to construct
a family of candidates for what might be called weak realizations for ϕ . To do this we must associate such a family with
every subformula of ϕ as well, and positive and negative subformulas of the form X are treated in different ways. In
negative subformulas of this form, the  operator must be replaced with justiﬁcation variables, and this replacement must
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manage this as simply as possible we introduce a small amount of machinery.
Let us assume that, in ϕ , each negative occurrence of  is numbered, 1,2, . . . , with numbering going from left to right.
(The left–right numbering is just to be speciﬁc—any numbering would do.) We call these numbers indexes of negative
occurrences of , and we say ϕ is indexed. Sometimes we indicate indexes as subscripts, though they are not an oﬃcial
part of the language. So, for instance, if we displayed the indexes in X ⊃ (Y ⊃X) we would see 1X ⊃ (2Y ⊃X).
Note that positive occurrences do not have indexes.
We set aside a family, x1, x2, . . . , of distinct justiﬁcation variables. When we replace a negative occurrence of  with
a justiﬁcation variable, if the occurrence has index i, we will use justiﬁcation variable xi . Thus i in ϕ turns into xi , this
choice is made ahead of time, and is ﬁxed.
Now we say how we associate a family of justiﬁcation formulas with each subformula X of ϕ , which we assume is
indexed. If X is a subformula of ϕ , the set associated with it is denoted 〈〈X〉〉ϕ .
Deﬁnition 5.3. Let ϕ be a formula of H(@), indexed. For each subformula Z of ϕ we deﬁne a set 〈〈Z〉〉ϕ of formulas of
J H(@). We have the following cases.
(i) A is an atomic subformula of ϕ (including ⊥ and nominals). Let 〈〈A〉〉ϕ = {A}.
(ii) X ⊃ Y is a subformula of ϕ . Let 〈〈X ⊃ Y 〉〉ϕ = {A ⊃ B | A ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ and B ∈ 〈〈Y 〉〉ϕ}.
(iii) @i X is a subformula of ϕ . Let 〈〈@i X〉〉ϕ = {@i A | A ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ}.
(iv) X is a negative subformula of ϕ with index n, so that X =n X .
Let 〈〈X〉〉ϕ = {xn : A | A ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ}.
(v) X is a positive subformula of ϕ .
Let 〈〈X〉〉ϕ = {t : (A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An) | A1, . . . , An ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ, t is any justiﬁcation term}.
If M = 〈G,R,E,V〉 is a basic hybrid-JT model, by ignoring the admissible evidence function E it can also be understood
as a basic hybrid-T model. As a basic hybrid-JT model, justiﬁcation terms t play a role; as a basic hybrid-T model  plays
a corresponding role. Different formal languages are involved. To keep this dual usage of the model clear, we will write
M,Γ hJT X to indicate that the formula X in the language J H(@) evaluates to true at world Γ of M, and we will write
M,Γ hT X to indicate that the formula X in the language H(@) evaluates to true at Γ . Details should be obvious, and we
omit them.
We extend notation a bit. If S is a set of formulas of J H(@), we write M,Γ hJT S to mean M,Γ hJT X for every
X ∈ S , and we write M,Γ hJT S to mean M,Γ hJT X for every X ∈ S . Notice that if M,Γ hJT S is not true, it does not
follow that M,Γ hJT S is, and similarly the other way around (unless S is a singleton).
In Section 4.4, in the course of the completeness argument, we showed how to construct S-canonical basic hybrid-JT
models, Deﬁnition 4.4. We now show a fundamental result that connects the modal and the justiﬁcation aspects of these
canonical models. Apart from requiring axiomatic adequacy, any constant speciﬁcation will do for what follows.
Theorem 5.4. Let M = 〈G,R,E,V〉 be a canonical model, as in Deﬁnition 4.4, and let ϕ be a formula in the modal language H(@),
assumed indexed. For each Γ ∈ G:
(i) If Z is a positive subformula of ϕ and M,Γ hJT 〈〈Z〉〉ϕ then M,Γ hT Z .
(ii) If Z is a negative subformula of ϕ and M,Γ hJT 〈〈Z〉〉ϕ then M,Γ hT Z .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of Z . The atomic case is simple, so we concentrate on the more complex
ones.
Positive Implication Suppose Z is (X ⊃ Y ), Z is a positive subformula of ϕ , M,Γ hJT 〈〈X ⊃ Y 〉〉ϕ , and the result is known
for X (which occurs negatively in ϕ) and for Y (which occurs positively).
Let X ′ ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , and Y ′ ∈ 〈〈Y 〉〉ϕ . Then (X ′ ⊃ Y ′) ∈ 〈〈X ⊃ Y 〉〉ϕ , so M,Γ hJT (X ′ ⊃ Y ′). It follows that M,Γ hJT X ′
and M,Γ hJT Y ′ . Since X ′ and Y ′ were arbitrary, it follows that M,Γ hJT 〈〈X〉〉ϕ and M,Γ hJT 〈〈Y 〉〉ϕ . Then by the
induction hypothesis, M,Γ hT X and M,Γ hT Y , and hence M,Γ hT (X ⊃ Y ).
Negative Implication Suppose Z is (X ⊃ Y ), Z is a negative subformula of ϕ , M,Γ hJT 〈〈X ⊃ Y 〉〉ϕ , and the result is known
for X (occurring positively in ϕ) and Y (occurring negatively in ϕ).
If M,Γ hJT 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , by the induction hypothesis M,Γ hT X , and hence M,Γ hT (X ⊃ Y ). Now suppose
M,Γ hJT 〈〈X〉〉ϕ is not the case. Then for some X ′ ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , M,Γ hJT X ′ . Let Y ′ be an arbitrary member of 〈〈Y 〉〉ϕ . Then
(X ′ ⊃ Y ′) ∈ 〈〈X ⊃ Y 〉〉ϕ , so by our assumptions M,Γ hJT (X ′ ⊃ Y ′). Since M,Γ hJT X ′ , then M,Γ hJT Y ′ . Since Y ′
was arbitrary, we have that M,Γ hJT 〈〈Y 〉〉ϕ , so by the induction hypothesis, M,Γ hT Y , and again M,Γ hT (X ⊃ Y ).
Positive Necessity Suppose Z is X , Z is a positive subformula of ϕ , M,Γ hJT 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , and the result is known for X
(occurring positively in ϕ). This is the one case that uses the fact that M is a canonical model.
Let 0 = Γ  ∪ {¬Z | Z ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ}, where Γ  was deﬁned in Stage 1 of the construction of the canonical model, in
Section 4.4. We ﬁrst show that 0 is consistent (using any axiomatically adequate constant speciﬁcation). Well, suppose
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hence so is (Y1 ⊃ (Y2 ⊃ · · · (Yk ⊃ (X1 ∨· · ·∨ Xn)) · · ·)). By Theorem 4.3, Internalization, there is a closed justiﬁcation term
u such that
u : (Y1 ⊃
(
Y2 ⊃ · · ·
(
Yk ⊃ (X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn)
) · · ·))
is provable. Since each Yi ∈ Γ  , for some justiﬁcation term ti , ti : Yi ∈ Γ . Repeated use of the · axiom scheme, and modus
ponens, yields the provability of
(
t1 : Y1 ⊃
(
t2 : Y2 ⊃ · · ·
(
tk : Yk ⊃
((
(u · t1) · t2
) · . . . · tk
) : (X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn)
) · · ·))
and since Γ is maximally consistent, (((u · t1) · t2) · . . . · tk) : (X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn) ∈ Γ . It follows by the Truth Lemma that
M,Γ hJT (((u · t1) · t2) · . . . · tk) : (X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn), contradicting the initial assumption that M,Γ hJT 〈〈X〉〉ϕ . Thus 0
is consistent.
The set 0 extends to a maximally consistent set, , and Γ  ⊆ . Since Γ ∈ G , and G is generated, it follows that
 ∈ G as well. Since {¬Z | Z ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ} ⊆ , using the Truth Lemma, M, hJT 〈〈X〉〉ϕ . By the induction hypothesis,
M,hT X , and since Γ R, M,Γ hT X .
Negative Necessity Suppose Z is X , Z is a negative subformula of ϕ , M,Γ hJT 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , and the result is known for (the
negatively occurring) X . Say X has index n in ϕ , that is, X is n X .
Let X ′ ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ . Then xn : X ′ ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , and so M,Γ hJT xn : X ′ . If  is any member of G with Γ R, we must have
M, hJT X ′ . Since X ′ was arbitrary, M, hJT 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , so by the induction hypothesis, M, hT X . And since  was
arbitrary, M,Γ hT X .
Positive @ Suppose Z is @i X , Z is a positive subformula of ϕ , M,Γ hJT 〈〈@i X〉〉ϕ , and the result is known for (the
positively occurring) X .
Let X ′ ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , so that @i X ′ ∈ 〈〈@X〉〉ϕ . Then M,Γ hJT @i X ′ , so M,V(i) hJT X ′ . Since X ′ was arbitrary,
M,V(i)hJT 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , so by the induction hypothesis, M,V(i)hT X , and hence M,Γ hT @i X .
Negative @ This case is similar to the Positive @ case. 
The following corollary gives a kind of realization embedding, but not with the simple form we really want. That will
come in the next section.
Theorem 5.5 (Weak Realization). Let ϕ be a formula in the language H(@), indexed. Suppose that ϕ is basic hybrid-T provable. Then
there are members ϕ1, . . . , ϕn of 〈〈ϕ〉〉ϕ such that ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn is a theorem of basic hybrid-JT (using any axiomatically adequate
constant speciﬁcation).
Proof. Assume ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn is not a theorem of basic hybrid-JT for every ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ 〈〈ϕ〉〉ϕ . Then S = {¬ϕ′ | ϕ′ ∈ 〈〈ϕ〉〉ϕ}
is consistent, for otherwise there would be some ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ 〈〈ϕ〉〉ϕ such that (¬ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ϕn) ⊃ ⊥ would be provable in
basic hybrid-JT, and then ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn would also be provable, contrary to our assumption. Since S = {¬ϕ′ | ϕ′ ∈ 〈〈ϕ〉〉ϕ} is
consistent, we can construct an S-canonical model in which S is satisﬁable. Then there is some world Γ of this canonical
model M at which all members of S are true, and so M,Γ hJT 〈〈ϕ〉〉ϕ . Then by Theorem 5.4, M,Γ hT ϕ , hence ϕ is not
basic hybrid-T provable. 
5.2. Realization, ﬁnally
We begin by deﬁning something very much like 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , Deﬁnition 5.3. This differs from the earlier version in one very
signiﬁcant instance, case 5.
Deﬁnition 5.6. Let ϕ be a formula in the language H(@), indexed. We associate a set, Xϕ , of formulas of J H(@) with
each subformula X of ϕ .
(i) A is an atomic subformula of ϕ . Aϕ = {A}.
(ii) X ⊃ Y is a subformula of ϕ . X ⊃ Y ϕ = {A ⊃ B | A ∈ Xϕ and B ∈ Y ϕ}.
(iii) @i X is a subformula of ϕ . @i Xϕ = {@i A | A ∈ Xϕ}.
(iv) X is a negative subformula of ϕ , with index n so that X =n X .
Xϕ =
{
xn : A
∣∣ A ∈ Xϕ
}
(v) X is a positive subformula of ϕ .
Xϕ =
{
t : A
∣∣ A ∈ Xϕ, t is any justiﬁcation term
}
Throughout this section we make use of substitutions, replacing justiﬁcation variables with justiﬁcation terms. A substi-
tution is a function σ = {z1/t1, . . . , zn/tn}, that maps variable zi to justiﬁcation term ti , and is the identity otherwise (it is
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a substitution σ to it will be denoted Xσ .
If X is a theorem of basic hybrid-JT, and σ is a substitution, Xσ will also be a theorem. This is easy to see, because
substitutions turn axioms into axioms, and rule applications into rule applications. However, the role of constants changes
as the result of a substitution. Suppose C is a constant speciﬁcation, A is an axiom, and c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : A is added to a proof
using Iterated Axiom Necessitation, where this addition meets constant speciﬁcation C . Since Aσ is also an axiom, Iterated
Axiom Necessitation allows us to add c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : Aσ to a proof, but this may no longer meet speciﬁcation C . However,
a new constant speciﬁcation, which we can call Cσ , can be computed from the original one—c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : Aσ ∈ Cσ just
in case c1 : c2 : . . . : cn : A ∈ C . But even if C was axiomatically appropriate, Cσ will not be—axioms that contain variables
that σ replaces will generally not have constants assigned to them. But if C is axiomatically appropriate, C ∪ Cσ will be.
Consequently, if X is provable using an axiomatically appropriate constant speciﬁcation, the same will be true for Xσ . From
now on we suppress such details.
Deﬁnition 5.7. Let ϕ be a formula of H(@), indexed. We say a substitution σ lives on subformula Z of ϕ provided, for every
x in the domain of σ , x = xk for some indexed necessity occurrence k in Z . We say σ lives away from subformula Z of
ϕ provided, for every x in the domain of σ , x = xk for every indexed necessity occurrence k in Z . We say σ meets the
no new variable condition provided, for every x in the domain of σ , the justiﬁcation term xσ contains no variables other
than x.
Lemma 5.8. Assume ϕ is a formula of H(@), indexed, and X is a subformula of ϕ .
(i) Let σY be a substitution that lives away from X. If W ∈ Xϕ then also WσY ∈ Xϕ .
(ii) Let σX be a substitution that lives on X and σY be a substitution that lives away from X, and assume both substitutions meet the
no new variable condition. Then σXσY = σYσX .
Proof. Part 1: The proof is by induction on the complexity of X . The atomic case is trivial since no variables are present,
and the ⊃ and @ cases are straightforward. This leaves the two modal cases.
Suppose X is a negative subformula of ϕ , and the result is known for X . Note that the occurrence of  in X is
negative, and so has an index assigned to it. If σY lives away from X , then if x : W is in Xϕ , the variable x cannot be
in the domain of σY , so (x : W )σY = x : (WσY ), and the result follows immediately, using the induction hypothesis.
Finally suppose X is a positive subformula of ϕ , σY lives away from X , and the result is known for X . Suppose
t : W ∈ Xϕ . Then (t : W )σY = (tσY ) : (WσY ). By the induction hypothesis, WσY ∈ Xϕ , and the result follows because
part 5 of Deﬁnition 5.6 allows for any justiﬁcation term.
Part 2: Assume the hypothesis, and let x be a variable; we show xσXσY = xσYσX .
First, suppose x = xk for some indexed necessity occurrence k in X . Since σX meets the no new variable condition, the
only justiﬁcation variable that can occur in xσX is x. Since σY lives away from X , xσY = x, and so xσXσY = xσX . But also,
xσYσX = xσX , hence xσXσY = xσYσX .
Second, suppose x = xk for every k in X . Since σX lives on X , xσX = x. And since σY meets the no new variable
condition, x is the only variable that can occur in xσY . Then xσYσX = xσY , and xσXσY = xσY , so xσXσY = xσYσX in this
case too. 
Here is the key result that will give us a Realization Theorem, when combined with work from the previous section.
Proposition 5.9. Let ϕ be a formula of H(@), indexed. For every Z that is a subformula of ϕ , and for each Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ 〈〈Z〉〉ϕ , there
is a substitution σ and a formula Z ′ of J H(@) such that:
(i) Z ′ ∈ Zϕ .
(ii) σ lives on Z and meets the no new variable condition.
(iii) If Z is a positive subformula of ϕ , (Z1 ∨ · · · ∨ Zn)σ ⊃ Z ′ is a theorem of basic hybrid-JT.
(iv) If Z is a negative subformula of ϕ , Z ′ ⊃ (Z1 ∧ · · · ∧ Zn)σ is a theorem of basic hybrid-JT.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of Z . If Z is atomic the result is trivial, since 〈〈Z〉〉ϕ = Zϕ = {Z}, and we can use
the empty substitution. We look at the non-atomic cases in detail.
Positive Implication Suppose Z is (X ⊃ Y ), Z is a positive subformula of ϕ , Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ 〈〈Z〉〉ϕ , and the result is known for
(negatively occurring) X and (positively occurring) Y .
For each i say Zi = (Xi ⊃ Yi), where Xi ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ and Yi ∈ 〈〈Y 〉〉ϕ . By the induction hypothesis there are substitutions
σX and σY , living on X and Y respectively and meeting the no new variable condition, and there are X ′ ∈ Xϕ and
Y ′ ∈ Y ϕ such that X ′ ⊃ (X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn)σX and (Y1 ∨ · · · ∨ Yn)σY ⊃ Y ′ are both provable in basic hybrid-JT. We will
M. Fitting / Journal of Applied Logic 8 (2010) 356–370 369show (Z1 ∨ · · ·∨ Zn)σ ⊃ Z ′ is provable, where σ = σXσY , and Z ′ = (X ′σY ⊃ Y ′σX ), and both σ and Z ′ meet the required
conditions.
Formulas X and Y are disjoint subformulas of ϕ , hence have no indexes in common, and so σX and σY have disjoint
domains. In particular, σX lives on X and so lives away from Y , while σY lives on Y and so lives away from X . Let σ be
σXσY = σYσX (these are equal by Lemma 5.8). It is easy to see that σ lives on X ⊃ Y and meets the no new variable
condition.
Since X ′ ⊃ (X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn)σX is provable then also [X ′ ⊃ (X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn)σX ]σY = [X ′σY ⊃ (X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn)σXσY ] is
provable (though the constant speciﬁcation may change), that is, X ′σY ⊃ (X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn)σ is provable. Similarly (Y1 ∨
· · · ∨ Yn)σ ⊃ Y ′σX is provable. Then the following is provable using only classical logic: [(X1 ⊃ Y1)∨ · · · ∨ (Xn ⊃ Yn)]σ ⊃
(X ′σY ⊃ Y ′σX ). By Lemma 5.8, X ′σY ∈ Xϕ since X ′ ∈ Xϕ and σY lives away from X . Likewise Y ′σX ∈ Y ϕ . Then
Z ′ = (X ′σY ⊃ Y ′σX ) ∈ X ⊃ Y ϕ and we are done.
Negative Implication Suppose Z is (X ⊃ Y ), Z is a negative subformula of ϕ , Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ 〈〈Z〉〉ϕ , and the result is known
for (positively occurring) X and (negatively occurring) Y .
Again for i = 1, . . . ,n say Zi = (Xi ⊃ Yi), where Xi ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ and Yi ∈ 〈〈Y 〉〉ϕ . This time, by the induction hypothesis
there are substitutions σX , living on X , and σY , living on Y , both meeting the no new variable condition, and there are
X ′ ∈ Xϕ and Y ′ ∈ Y ϕ such that both (X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn)σX ⊃ X ′ and Y ′ ⊃ (Y1 ∧ · · · ∧ Yn)σY are provable. Then again, if
we set σ = σXσY = σYσX , the following is provable: (X ′σY ⊃ Y ′σX ) ⊃ [(X1 ⊃ Y1) ∧ · · · ∧ (Xn ⊃ Yn)]σ . Also X ′σY ∈ Xϕ
and Y ′σX ∈ Y ϕ , so (X ′σY ⊃ Y ′σX ) ∈ X ⊃ Y ϕ , and this establishes this case.
Positive Necessity Suppose Z is X , Z is a positive subformula of ϕ , Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ 〈〈Z〉〉ϕ , and the result is known for
(positively occurring) X .
In this case Z1, . . . , Zn are of the form t1 : D1, . . . , tn : Dn , where each ti is some justiﬁcation term and Di is a
disjunction of members of 〈〈X〉〉ϕ . Let D = D1 ∨· · ·∨ Dn be the disjunction of the Di . D itself is a disjunction of members
of 〈〈X〉〉ϕ , so by the induction hypothesis there is some substitution σ , living on X and meeting the no new variable
condition, and there is some member X ′ ∈ Xϕ such that Dσ ⊃ X ′ is provable. Consequently for each i, Diσ ⊃ X ′
is provable and so, by Internalization, there is a justiﬁcation term ui such that ui : (Diσ ⊃ X ′) is provable. But then
(ti : Di)σ ⊃ (ui · tiσ) : X ′ is also provable (using the fact that (ti : Di)σ = (tiσ) : (Diσ)). Let s be the justiﬁcation term
(u1 · t1σ) + · · · + (un · tnσ). For each i we have the provability of (ti : Di)σ ⊃ s : X ′ , and hence that of (t1 : D1 ∨ · · · ∨ tn :
Dn)σ ⊃ s : X ′ . Since s : X ′ ∈ Xϕ , this concludes the positive necessity case.
Negative Necessity Suppose Z is X , Z is a negative subformula of ϕ , Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ 〈〈Z〉〉ϕ , and the result is known for
(negatively occurring) X . Say the occurrence of  in X has index k, that is Z =k X .
In this case Z1, . . . , Zn are of the form xk : X1, . . . , xk : Xn , where each Xi ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ . By the induction hypothesis there
is some substitution σ and some X ′ ∈ Xϕ such that X ′ ⊃ (X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn)σ is provable, where σ lives on X and meets
the no new variable condition. We will show Z ′ ⊃ (Z1 ∧ · · · ∧ Zn)σ ′ is provable, where σ ′ = σ {xk/(s · xk)}, Z ′ = xk :
X ′{xk/(s · xk)}, for a particular s, and σ ′ and Z ′ meet the required conditions.
For each i = 1, . . . ,n, the formula X ′ ⊃ Xiσ is provable, so by Internalization there is a closed justiﬁcation term ti
such that ti : (X ′ ⊃ Xiσ) is provable. Let s be the justiﬁcation term t1 +· · ·+ tn; then s : (X ′ ⊃ Xiσ) is provable, for each i.
Now consider the substitution σ0 = {xk/(s · xk)}. For each i = 1, . . . ,n, s : (X ′ ⊃ Xiσ) is provable, hence so is [s : (X ′ ⊃
Xiσ)]σ0. Since s is a closed justiﬁcation term, s : (X ′σ0 ⊃ Xiσσ0) is provable. Then for each i, xk : X ′σ0 ⊃ (s · xk) : Xi(σσ0)
is provable. Since k X is an indexed subformula of ϕ , index k cannot occur as an index in X . Substitution σ lives on X ,
hence xk is not in its domain, nor is it introduced by σ since σ meets the no new variable condition. It follows that
xk(σσ0) = xkσ0 = (s · xk), and so [xk : Xi](σσ0) = (s · xk) : Xi(σσ0). Then for each i, xk : X ′σ0 ⊃ [xk : Xi](σσ0) is provable,
and so xk : X ′σ0 ⊃ [xk : Xi ∧ · · · ∧ xk : Xn](σσ0) is provable.
The substitution σ0 lives away from X so, since X ′ ∈ Xϕ then also X ′σ0 ∈ Xϕ by Lemma 5.8. If we let Z ′ be
xk : X ′σ0, we have that Z ′ ∈ k Xϕ , that is, Z ′ ∈ Zϕ . And if we let σ ′ = σσ0, it is easy to check that σ lives on Z and
meets the no new variable condition. And ﬁnally, we have veriﬁed that Z ′ ⊃ (Z1 ∧ · · · ∧ Zn)σ ′ is provable.
Positive @ Suppose Z is @i X , Z is a positive subformula of ϕ , Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ 〈〈Z〉〉ϕ , and the result is known for (positively
occurring) X .
In this case Z1, . . . , Zn are of the form @i X1, . . . ,@i Xn , for some X1, . . . , Xn ∈ 〈〈X〉〉ϕ . By the induction hypothesis there
is a substitution σ and a formula X ′ ∈ Xϕ such that (X1 ∨ · · ·∨ Xn)σ ⊃ X ′ is provable, and σ lives on X and meets the
no new variable condition. Then using @-Necessitation and K@ we have provability of @i(X1 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn)σ ⊃ @i X ′ . Since
@i distributes across a disjunction, we have provability of (@i X1 ∨ · · · ∨@i Xn)σ ⊃ @i X ′ , and this establishes the result in
this case.
Negative @ Similar to the preceeding case.
This concludes the proof. 
A remark on the proof above. It is based on an argument in [7], for Proposition 7.8 in the numbering of that paper. The
original proof (but not the result) contains an error, manifesting itself in the Positive and Negative Implication parts, and
in the Negative Necessity part. That error has been corrected here, and by ignoring nominals the present proof provides a
correct proof of the earlier result.
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Theorem 5.10 (Realization). If ϕ is a theorem of basic hybrid-T, there is some ϕ′ ∈ ϕϕ that is a theorem of basic hybrid-JT using
some axiomatically appropriate constant speciﬁcation.
Proof. Suppose ϕ is a theorem of basic hybrid-T. By Theorem 5.5, there are ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ 〈〈ϕ〉〉ϕ such that ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn
is a theorem of basic hybrid-JT. Then by Proposition 5.9 there is a substitution σ and a formula ϕ′ ∈ ϕϕ such that
(ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn)σ ⊃ ϕ′ is a theorem of basic hybrid-JT. Since (ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn)σ is also provable, so is ϕ′ . 
Note that if ϕ′ ∈ ϕϕ , ϕ′ results from some replacement of  occurrences in ϕ so that negative occurrences are replaced
by distinct justiﬁcation variables. Then the result above really amounts to the usual formulation of Realization.
6. Conclusion
A hybrid/justiﬁcation logic analog of the modal logic T has been examined. Other modal logics can be treated similarly,
though how far this can be pushed remains to be seen. To weaken things to K will require some adjustment, since the
analog of X ⊃ X plays an important role in the proof of Proposition 4.2, but this does not seem to be a major issue.
A move to analogs of K4 and S4 seems equally plausible, and probably S5 will not be diﬃcult.
Unfortunately, the hybrid machinery we have been using is that of basic hybrid logic—it is not assumed that all possible
worlds are named by nominals. It is the move to named models that gives hybrid logics much of their interest and power.
The machinery for working with named models, proof theoretically, involves the addition of rules to basic hybrid logic.
Analogs of these rules can be added to our hybrid/justiﬁcation logics. The diﬃculty is in coming up with appropriate and
intuitively plausible machinery to allow us to prove an Internalization Theorem, as we did in Theorem 4.3. Almost certainly,
once Internalization is achieved other things will fall into place quickly. We hope others will take up this investigation.
Even though we have presented a logic that explicitly combines aspects of both its model theory and its proof theory
there is, as yet, no interesting interaction between these. Expressive machinery is present, but nothing much is done with it.
One can think of justiﬁcation logics as being logics of knowledge in which explicit reasons for knowledge can be discussed.
One might think that combining such machinery with the ability to ‘talk about’ states should allow something signiﬁcant to
be said. The language of hybrid-JT needs to be explored. What does it allow us to say? This, too, is something we encourage
others to think about.
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